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This art-based research project problematizes constructed postwar Japanese identity by 
unravelling the links between Japan’s Eurocentrism, the country’s active invitation of the 
Orientalist gaze, and the artificial amnesia of its colonial aggression towards other Asian 
countries.  
Needing to take advantage of Orientalist projections by dominant Western powers, postwar 
Japanese national and cultural identity resorted to self-Orientalism. The “Japan Brand” 
Strategy— the government-owned production site of “Cool Japan” imagery and cultural policy,  
not only created a liberated and humane image of postwar Japan globally but it was also devised 
as a mechanism to induce a collective amnesia that allowed Japan to disregard its colonial past 
and engender a soft nationalism. This narcissistic discourse celebrates the rise of the Japanese 
economy, affirming the country’s superiority while distancing itself from the imaginary 
“impoverished” continent of Asia. Through time, Japan’s self-defined “pure originality”—which 
emerged as a counter-narrative to Japan’s being infamous for its ability to imitate to the West—
became internalized by the Japanese, along with the new marketable versions of Japaneseness. 
Japan’s self-Orientalism was an unexpected side-effect of playing US’s “Japan” (a subordinate’s 
double identification) and its dependence on the dominant West. 
Using shanzhai (meaning “fake” and the idea that nothing is original), my art project aims to 
rethink constructed Japanese identities as delinked from the idea of “originality” and devoid of 
internalized Orientalism. Employing speculative fiction tropes to communicate the contingency 
of Japanese identities, my art project defamiliarizes current discourses surrounding Japanese 
identity. Contributing to the fields of Japanese studies and visual cultures, my art project is a 
visual assemblage employing photography, videography, contemporary digital media, stock 
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DREAMS COME TRUE VERY MUCH 
 
Time begun to have flown backwards in time.  
 
I was watching Japan sliding on the conveyor belt. 
 
I was watching it fall over  
                            the edge,  
   being stuffed into a box,  
 
     but the box never became full  
 
and before I knew it, what was Japan,  
 
                had become a god;   
    
                      a god in the form of rice. 
 
 
"Eat me,” the god said. 
 
I was about to throw out the rice that kept saying "勿体ない、勿体ない.”  
The rice had my grandmother's hands; they were reaching out to me. 
 
I tried to hold her soft hands—hands forbidden from making sushi—they  
2 
 
sli       
pped  
out of 
 mine.  
  
   Rice in the doorway, waiting— 
 Throw the rice against the wall 
 
permission to take off your shoes. 
 
but then I felt compassionate. 
  
The rice that is me that is god. 




   begun  
 to 
 have     
            flown 
 
backwards 
in           
   time 
 




“JAPANESENESS”: A PRODUCT OF INTERNALIZING THE 
WESTERN GAZE 
It was through STYLY, a Japanese platform that offers free VR/AR creations that I came across a 
sea of “Japanese” faces with Caucasian features—or perhaps they were Caucasian faces with 
“Japanese” features. This website, which is available only in Japanese, has a yellow button that 
invites me to generate up to fifty non-existent faces; “Make a face with AI!,” the button reads. 
These non-existent faces are generated using Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN): a class of 
machine learning frameworks that use a set of original photos to create images that look 
“superficially authentic” to human observers.  
 
My speculation that the faces are “Japanese” does not stem from a preconceived notion that 
physical features are inherently tied to identities. Most users score low on Dyske Suematsu’s 
Alllooksame.com—a website offering a “test” consisting of digital photographs of Asian women 
and men, that invites users to guess whether the photograph is of a Chinese, Japanese, or 
Korean person. The space is produced by a Japanese company (Photo AC) which targets 
Japanese or Japanese speakers who wish to use these images for promotional purposes. 
Although the details of the models are not provided, the models on their other pages are 





Figure 1. Screenshot of image from https://www.photo-ac.com/main/genface 
The Japanese term “hāfu” refers to an individual born to one ethnic Japanese and one non-
Japanese parent. It is a loanword from English (the term literally means "half"), a reference to 
the individual's non-Japanese heritage: "you are only ‘half’ Japanese.” Japan’s government and 
large parts of its society promote nihonjinron, a nationalistic adherence to a particular 
conceptualisation of Japanese identity which is ethnically and linguistically “homogenous and 
culturally unique"1. Many politicians even attribute Japan’s economic success (being the only 
non-Western nation competing with “developed” Western nations, such as the US) to its self-
proclaimed ethnic and cultural homogeneity. 
 
Aspiring to be ethnically homogenous while wanting “whiteness”2, Japan celebrates its ethnic 
purity, yet hāfus—which in most social contexts refer exclusively to Caucasian-mixed Japanese—
are in many ways celebrated in mass media—a practice imbedded in social norms. This 
contradictory desire of Japan is reflected in the term, hāfu, which is in katakana (a Japanese 
syllabary system that Japanese textbooks explains to be for foreign loanwords). As Neriko Musha 
Doerr and Yuri Kumagai asserts, this textbook explanation regarding katakana frames Western 
words as “cool”3, while kango (Chinese-origin words) are defined as Japanese. Kango is codified 
in Japanese national dictionaries rather than foreign loanword dictionaries.4 Both the term hāfu 
and katakana reflect Japan’s historically changing relationships to other countries, such as the 
US—the dominant power in the West—and China, an older neighbouring nation that much of 
Japan’s religious, artistic, and moral civilization, as well as Japan’s recent economic-political 
hegemon, is derived from. Such terms prove that Japan supports a dichotomous distinction 
between that which is Japanese and that which is foreign.  
 
The sea of AI-generated faces represents the state of postwar Japan: a country caught in the 
complicit opposition of being one of the first to “modernize" via Westernization in Asia, yet still 
subordinate to Western countries. The imaginary faces represent Japan’s “introverted urge to 
counter external, dominant Western cultures”5 while exhibiting traits of whiteness, a mentality 
firmly rooted within the Japanese psyche.  
 
 
1 Rod Fisher, “The Japan country report of 2013-2014 Preparatory Action ‘Culture in the EU’s External relations’,” edited by 
Yudhishthir Raj Isar (2014), 4, https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/policy/international-cooperation/documents/country-
reports/japan_en.pdf. 
2 Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press,1993): 6. 
3 Neriko Musha Doerr and Yuri Kumagai, “Power of language ideologies: Challenging the notion of foreign loanwords in Japanese-
as-a-foreign-language classroom,” Writing Systems Research, 6:2 (2014): 154. 
4 Idem, 151. 




This thesis is not based on ethnographic fieldwork; instead, it attempts to provide an 
ethnographic account of the broader term, “Japaneseness.” My arts-informed research project 
explores and questions discourses surrounding the postwar Japanese national and cultural 
identity that has been deeply complicit with Western discourses and essentializes Japaneseness. 
Using speculative fiction narratives and conceptualizations of cyborgs as a metaphor to critique 
aspects of Japanese identities, my art project defamiliarizes and restructures our experiences 
with current Japanese socio-political environments. 
 
As a strategy to create artworks that critique and allow a rethinking of the national and cultural 
identity of Japan, I am considering the following questions: 
 
A. How can I, through the act of creating my artwork, use “alternative futurity”6 as a concept, to 
“delink” and “relink”7 my identity as a Japanese woman from “self-colonizing 
identification”8? 
B. How can my exploration of my own future identities help me generate a subjective ontological 
understanding of being a Japanese woman living in North America in the here and now?  
C. How can photography, videography, stock images and contemporary digital media be used to 
explore possibilities of “radical reconstitution”9? 
 
My interdisciplinary project falls under the categories of digital animation, audio-visual 
installations, and prose-poetry. Using science fiction narratives, political and social possibilities 
are emphasized in the narrative of this film. By doing so, I aim to defamiliarize and restructure 
our experiences with current Japanese socio-political environments and our present. By 
presenting not only Japanese identities but identities as a whole as malleable, my project seeks 
to illustrate how the unified category of Japanese and humans are categorically interpellated and 
performatively constituted through discourses. Using shanzhai (meaning “fake” and the idea that 
nothing is original, Han), my art project rethinks constructed Japanese identities, delinking them 
from essentialized notions of “originality” and internalized Orientalism. 
 
In the first chapter “Construction/Fake Memory,” I disrupt the hidden historical interplay 
between Japan’s Eurocentrism, the country’s active invitation of the Orientalist gaze, and the 
artificial amnesia of its colonial aggression towards other Asian countries through a theoretical 
lens. This chapter is informed by Japanese studies, media studies, post-colonial studies, and 
critical race theory, and media studies. In the first section, “’Cool Japan’: Erased Memory and 
 
6 Soyang Park, Supervisor Comments, OCAD University, Aug 7, 2020. 
7 Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 
229. 




Japan’s Self-Orientalism,” through personal and global herstory, I highlight the deeply rooted 
consciousness of Japan’s “complicit oppositioning between Japanese self-Orientalization and 
Western Orientalization”10 to emphasize what is often swept under the rug. I investigate the 
Japanese government’s interest in developing foreign-policy strategies based on essentialized 
notions of “Japan,” focusing on “Cool Japan” policy. In “Japan’s Self-Claimed ‘Cultural DNA’ and 
Nationalism,” I analyze how Japan’s self-Orientalism functions in order to construct an exclusive 
national and cultural identity. I will focus on the “Japan Brand strategy,” which exploits Japanese 
popular culture as a mechanism for national mobilization to revitalize patriotic pride. In “‘White’ 
Japan and Asia as an Impoverished ‘Other’” I discuss obscured racism in contemporary Japan and 
trace the processes of the construction of “whiteness”11 within Japanese identity. I analyze how 
the strategic binary opposition between the “West” and “Japan” has been historically 
complemented by a third party: an imaginary undesirable “Asia.” In the section, “Amnesia 
Institutionalized,” I discuss how Japan’s superiority, underpinned by the country’s lingering 
asymmetrical power relations with other Asian countries, has been re-asserted with the notion 
of soft power—the “Japan Brand Strategy”— a strategy propelled specifically to induce amnesia 
towards Japan’s wartime crimes. In “China as the Emerging ‘Other’ I discuss Japan’s identification 
with the new Asian economic-political hegemon, China, and China’s contributions to the 
construction of postwar Japanese identity. In “Constructed ‘Memory’,” I contend that the 
Japanese government’s desire to maintain a sanitized and acceptable past, along with the 
content expectations Japan adopted encouraged by the dominant Western powers, governs the 
false “memory” implanted in the Japanese which contributes to the construction of Japanese 
identity. In “’Colonized Japanese Identities Live Forever: The Japanese State’s Data Colonization,” 
I critique the social and ideological biases manifested in both “whiteness”12 and the male 
domination that informs postwar Japanese identity, as well as the agendas of digital 
technologies. I unpack how the Japanese state plans to use digital technologies as renewed 
forms of oppression in the post- “Moonshot Research & Development Program,” AI-driven 
future.  
The second chapter, “Deconstruction,” discusses deconstructivist theories, speculative fiction, 
digital technologies, feminist theories, and translation theories to imagine futurities of Japan. In 
“Shanzhai (山寨) and Japaneseness: Deconstructing Orientalism,” I use Byun Chul-Han’s 
conceptualization of deconstruction in Chinese, shanzhai, to rethink Japanese identities as 
delinked from the idea of “pure originality”13 and internalized Orientalism. In “Imagining 
Future(s) of Japan: Identities as contingent,” I explain how speculative fiction tropes 
 
10 Iwabuchi, “Recentering Globalization,” 11. 
11 Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993). 
12 Frankenberg, White Women, 6. 
13 Tom Forester, “Consuming electronics: Japan's strategy for control,” Media Information Australia 67 (1993): 4-16. 
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communicate the contingency of Japanese identities. I introduce works by authors such as Yoko 
Tawada and Larissa Lai which support my use of critical science fiction narratives as a tool to 
disrupt current discourses surrounding Japanese identities.  
The third chapter, “Reconstruction” discusses theories related to memory, technology, and 
translation. In “What Can Cyborgs (Not) Do about Japanese Identities?,” I discuss the possibilities 
and limitations of Donna Haraway’s “reconstructed imaginary.” I draw parallels between her 
manifestation of cyborgs and aspects of constructed “Japaneseness” that aim to whitewash 
cultural “memories.” Media and feminist theories related to memory and technology are 
discussed: the writing of Paolo Ricaurte, Julia R DeCook, and Pratistha Bhattarai contextualize my 
understanding of “data colonialism,” enabling my discussion of the “Moonshot Research & 
Development Program.” In the final section of the second chapter, I discuss how language and 
translation affect one’s creative and critical directions which is another grounding theme in my 
thesis project. Referring to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Politics of Translation,” I investigate the 
political dimensions of translation that eliminate the identities of the oppressed and give 
prominence to English and other hegemonic languages. I also look at how Yoko Tawada uses the 
concept of “poetic ravine” (詩的な峡谷) in her works to intentionally fall in the liminal space 
between language A and language B. 
In the final chapter, I discuss the strategies in my art project. The artwork for my thesis 
exhibition, “Dreams Come True Very Much” is described in detail. I address the theoretical 
underpinnings and methodological aspects of the film, audio-visual installation, and prose-










“COOL JAPAN”: ERASED MEMORY AND JAPAN’S SELF-
ORIENTALISM 
 
Growing up in England in the ages between ten and sixteen, I was fascinated to find things of 
Japanese “origin” grotesquely localized in different parts of the world. Around the beginning of 
the present century, Japan’s popular culture diplomacy was firmly institutionalized by the “Cool 
Japan” policy: a national project incorporated into the Japanese Intellectual Property Strategy, 
promoted by the state since 2002. This led to an emergence of the “Japan Brand Strategy,” a 
framework and tactics devised by the annual Intellectual Property Strategic Programs to produce 
revitalized cultural imagery for Japan, capitalizing on the global success of Japanese popular 
culture.  
 
During 2000s, the high point of the reception of Japanese culture, I watched Euro-American 
representations of Japanese cultural phenomena such as otaku culture, techno-culture, and 
bizarre sexual practices. Seeing the conventional, stereotypical image of Japan that I know too 
well did not surprise me. What captivated me is how Japan is actively distorted for others’ 
convenience—mostly Euro-American countries. The overall response of Japanese viewers to 
Euro-American notion of Orientalized “Japan” is not anger, but pride; they narcissistically14 
observe this “exotic Japan” that satisfies foreigners. For instance, a weekly magazine article 
reported Western representations of bizarre Japanese cultural phenomena under the title “Such 
a pleasantly distorted image of the Japanese.”15 Japan’s cultural power has a strong desire to 
take initiative from Western others in cultural representations of “Japan.”  
 
This active invitation of the Orientalist gaze also results from a rising boom in “Japan 
glorification” in contemporary Japan. Saburo Ienaga explains that this glorification has a long 
history, dating to the pre-1940s, when Japan was a “warfare state.”16 Japan waged war against 
its neighbors: China (twice: 1894-95 and 1931-45) and Tsarist Russia (1904-05). Japan also 
turned the Korean Peninsula into a colony in 1910. During this period, inoculated with militarism 
through its education system, the Japanese people believed that dying for the nation in the 
 
14Koichi Iwabuchi, “’Soft’ Nationalism and Narcissism: Japanese Popular Culture Goes Global,” Asian Studies Review 26, no. 4 (2002): 
447-469.  
15 Hiroo Yamagara, “Ōbei mihōyakubon ni miru kono tanoshiku yuganda Nihonjinzō,” Shūokan, Asahi 24, December 1993, 130-
132. 
16 Saburo Ienaga. "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security 18, no. 3 (1993): 115. 
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battlefield was a supreme virtue.17 Newspapers, magazines, and books were full of news and 
stories exalting martial values and romanticizing war, and the steady accumulation of 
chauvinistic information encouraged jingoism. 18 
 
This “Japan glorification” also goes hand in hand with the glorification of war in Japanese 
education and the country’s historical revisionism. Although defeat in World War II transformed 
Japan into a “peace state,”19 the popular self-praising consciousness imbued into the Japanese 
was not restructured overnight. Indeed, it has been encouraged by the government’s conscious 
tilt toward nationalism and militarism and is reflected in the nation’s flawed certification 
procedure for textbooks.20  
 
For instance, the content of Japan’s history textbooks has, for several decades, been an issue 
both in Japan’s domestic debate and its international relations with North and South Korea, 
China, Taiwan, and other neighbouring countries. Textbooks in Japan have to pass a pre-
publication screening. Since the mid-1950s, the textbooks increasingly reflect the ideology of the 
ruling conservative politicians, and the government has sought to exclude vivid depictions of the 
horrors of war, as well as Japan’s responsibility for wars, and Japan’s war crimes.21 In the 1980s, 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) undertook a campaign seeking revision of some 100 
textbooks, with a “thrust toward greater respect, in effect, for State Shinto, big business, duties 
instead of rights, and the military instead of pacifism.”22 The minister of education also asked 
that high school textbook writers and publishers “soften their approach to Japan ‘s excesses 
during World War II, the horrors of the atom bombs… and the pacifist requirements of the 
Constitution (Article 9). More stress was suggested on patriotism, [and] the constitutionality of 
the Self-Defense Forces.”23 Ienaga cites Lawrence Ward Beer, who claims, “blistering attacks 
were leveled at Japan ‘s leaders by [other] Asians for insensitivity to East Asian memories of 
Japan’s arrogant and inhumane treatment of its neighbors before 1945 and for outright 
dishonesty in the textbook presentation of historical fact.”24 
 
Today, there is a rise in self-praising discourses—a sign that the jingoistic sentiment lives on. 
Scholarly articles argue that such narratives have been increasingly embraced by media products 
since the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. They boast how great Japan is, targeting domestic 
consumers. For instance, television shows such as “Rediscover Japan” and “Nippon! Sugoi Desu 
 
17 Ienaga. "The Glorification of War,” 116. 
18 Idem. 
19 Idem. 
20 Idem, 124. 
21 Idem. 
22 Idem, 113. 




Ne! Shisatsudan (meaning Japan surprises the world!)” revolve around foreign visitors being 
interviewed about how “cool” Japan is—all dubbed in Japanese. NHK’s jingoistic “Cool Japan” 
program similarly focuses on making the most innocuous subjects seem like triumphs the 
Japanese should be proud of. Even travel shows focused on exploring other countries tend focus 
on how Japan is represented abroad. Universal Studios Japan opened a special “Cool Japan 
Zone” in 2016, featuring attractions devoted to “four popular brands from Japan that are 














Figure 2. The popular franchises from four Japanese anime and video games which appeared at 
Universal Studios Japan for “Universal Cool Japan 2020” from January 21, 2020, to June 28, 2020. 
The slogan claims “Enjoy the Japan that the World Praises!” 
 
This self-praising rhetoric has been used to strategically and coercively overwrite the 
“memory”25 of the Japanese who have a “collective, biological fear” of natural disasters, of 
earthquakes, tsunamis, and radioactivity. This includes myself. I came across the term 
“collective, biological fear” during a conversation with theorist and performance artist Ayumi 
Goto which was useful in thinking through Japanese nationalisms. The “Japan glorification” 
rhetoric also is a form of national coping that has only been egged on by the state of affairs in 
the continent, as Japan's influence in the region lessens compared to China (Japan’s emerging 
“Other,” which I will discuss later).  
 
In discussing the process of the construction of postwar Japanese identity and its relation to self-
Orientalism, the arguments in this section revolve around Japan’s relation to the US  and other 
Asian countries. I also discuss Japan’s “two paralleling and complementing mental 
 
25 Cassandra L Jnes, "Memory and Resistance: Doro's Empire, Mary's Rebellion, and Anyanwu as Lieu De Mémoire in Octavia E. 
Butler's Mind of My Mind and Wild Seed," Women's Studies, vol. 47, no. 7 (2018): 700. 
11 
 
genealogies”26: the nation’s unequal power relation with US, which motivates Japan’s self-
Orientalism, and Japan’s popular-cultural diplomacy, which induces “collective amnesia” in other 
Asian countries.  
 
Since Japan’s defeat the US has deeply penetrated Japanese culture. Considering the 
overconcentration of American military bases in Japan and the threats Okinawans are facing 
today, one can say that the US occupation of Japan persists. Yoshikuni Igarashi explains that “the 
tension between the desires to forget and to remember the past of defeat” in World War II has 
shaped the cultural productions of postwar Japanese society.27 Norihiko Kato calls this “a sense 
of nihilism.”28 As Kato claims, Japanese people realized that Japan’s dependence on the US may 
never end, and that reasonable political solutions to the country’s problems are not 
forthcoming.29 Kato asserts that this led to Japan finding itself in a “bizarre”30 position. 
 
This “bizarreness” steeped into the realm of everyday culture in postwar Japan. In Ivy Marilyn’s 
analysis of domestic tourism campaigns of Japan National Railways during the 1970s and 1980s, 
she notes that the "Exotic Japan" campaign exhibited a cheerful appropriation of Western 
Orientalist images of Japan.31 Such Orientalist images of Japan, including Buddhist temples, 
geisha, and Mt Fuji, were featured to promote the domestic consumption of the exoticism of 
Japanese traditional culture among Japanese urban dwellers. As the campaign humorously 
renders “Japan” its own exotic "foreign" object, we see an interplay between "the non-Japanese 
seen through Japanese eyes and Japan seen through Westerners.”32 Dorinne Kondo argues that 
this shift testifies to: 
 
[an] incorporation of Western elements and a Western gaze that beats the West at its 
own game, and subverts, as it reinscribes, Orientalist tropes. It marks a moment in 
historical, geopolitical relations, where auto-exoticism and the appropriation of the West 
in a refigured, essential Japan indexes Japan's accession to the position of powerful 
nation-states.33 
 
This interplay shows that Japan’s “pleasurable” consumption of Westernized images of its 
distorted self is not based upon Japan's being in a dominant position. It is, instead, one of a few 
tactics available to Japan: a means to maintain power. In this regard, Japan is not simply “Japan,” 
 
26 Soyang Park, Supervisory Comments, OCAD University, February 7 2021 
27 Idem.  




31 Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, phantasm, Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 29-65. 
32 Idem, 50. 
33 Dorinne Kondo, About face: Performing Race in Fashion and Theater (New York: Routledge, 1997), 84. 
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but a Japan playing America’s “Japan”: what John Caughie calls, in his analysis of US media 
domination of the world 34, the “subordinate’s double identification” with see-er and seen.  
 
Self-Orientalism—Japan is not being American but playing at being America’s Japan. This game is 
played through objectification, being the object of the Western gaze. The subordinated Japan 
empowers itself by “objectifying the center and rendering it as its own other […] the permitted 
games of subordination”35. In this game, the subordinated adopts a “ironic knowingness that 
may escape the obedience of interpellation or cultural colonialism and may offer a way of 
thinking subjectivity free of subjection.”36 In this objectification, “Japan,” as the object of 
Western cultural domination, is suspended; it positions itself outside the grounds of domination. 
It is not a double identification with subject and object, but a substitution of the unstable 
doubleness articulated in the relationship between games and tactics—a pleasurable game 
overlooked by the otherwise subordinated Japanese spectators. By suspending Japan's position 
as the object of domination, “Japan" is kept out of the colonizer’s reach; this game attempts to 
claim that there is not a “Japan" that can be dominated by Western cultural domination. 
 
Kato also asserts this: since the occupation, Japan has pursued a form of resistance that is an 
emulation of the American way; resistance infinitesimally close to imitation, while politically, the 
nation has bumbled alongside the United States in a path, possibly, toward what Kato calls the 
nation’s “ruination”37. This environment was an ideal incubator for what he calls “cultural 
expressions of the power of voicelessness”38, the ideology of the “Japanese Cool”—which 
strategically induces “collective amnesia”39 of its own war crimes towards other Asian countries. 
As Daliot-Bul contends, this strategy was propelled in the 1970s, specifically by the necessity to 
soften anti-Japan perceptions, notably in Southeast Asia.40 Igarashi explains that after Japan’s 
devasting defeat in 1945, the process of reassembling the fragments of the nation as a 
“peaceful” country was achieved through nationalism. However, this was done subtly through 
the realm of everyday culture, not straightforward political discourse. 
 
The wave of the “Japanese Cool” is an unexpected side-effect of Japan’s history of being 
dependent on the US. This mechanism, which justifies Japan’s cultural amnesia towards its own 
war crimes in neighbouring countries, is also perpetuated by Japan’s “ally,” the US, who further 
reifies the erasure of collective trauma from the era of Japanese colonization. For instance, as 
 
34 John Caughie, Playing at being American: Games and tactics In Logics of television, ed. P. Mellencamp: (London: British Film 
Institute, 1990), 44-58. 
35 Idem, 44. 
36 Idem, 54. 
37 Kato, “Goodbye Godzilla,” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2006/09/01/goodbye-godzilla-hello-kitty/. 
38 Kato, “Goodbye Godzilla.” 
39 Daliot-Bul, “Japan Brand Strategy,” 254. 
40 Iwabuchi, "Pop-Culture Diplomacy," 420. 
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Soyang Park asserts, the violence imposed on the women who were abducted and coerced into 
sexual slavery against their will (also known as “comfort women”) by Japanese imperialists was 
continued after the war when society forgot about them.41 Park states that this amnesia derived 
from the geopolitical and neo-colonial economic climate that emerged in postwar East Asia 
under US and Japanese hegemony.42  
 
The case of the US-led 1945-1948 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as 
the Tokyo trial), which failed to address Japan’s colonial responsibility, is an example of this 
postwar amnesia in Japan in relation to the sexual slaves’ issues. The trial was “a political show 
based on a deal made between US and Japan” as US needed Japan to be an ally for its postwar 
project in East Asia.43 The trial allowed huge political concessions to Japan: as many scholars 
have pointed out, there was an absence of colonial questions in the Tokyo trial and "there was 
hardly any discussion on Japanese colonial rule in Korea.”44 The tribunal did not prosecute 
crimes against humanity. The Allied Powers, including the US, were not critical of their own 
imperialist past, and thus were indifferent to colonial questions in general.45  
 
Park also notes that Korea was subject to Japan-US political hegemony as Korea was 
economically dependent on the aid of industrialized Japan and the US in the postwar era. This 
prevented the Korean government from laying charges of wartime crimes by the Japanese 
government: Kim Jong-pil, a minister of Park Junghee’s military dictatorship, signed the Japan 
and Korea Agreement in exchange for a huge loan from Japan to Korea. The agreement states 
that Japan’s responsibility for any damages caused to Korean people were to be closed. Park 
echoes arguments by political experts and war crimes in Korea, that although the agreement 
should be reviewed, and it could be proven invalid, Japanese respondents to the sexual slaves’ 
debate have used this agreement to deny responsibility for the wartime crimes.46 
 
Much like the case of the Tokyo trial, the “Cool Japan” policy continues to induce amnesia in 
Japan and other Asian countries. It establishes Japan as a country with a clean record, situating it 
in a position to erase its colonial history. In both cases, the Tokyo Trial and the economy-driven 
“Cool Japan,” the US leveraged the postwar position of both nations, implicating itself within 
both systems in order to accumulate power in the long-term. 
 
 
41 Soyang Park. "Silence, Subaltern Speech and the Intellectual in South Korea: The Politics of Emergent Speech in the Case of 
Former Sexual Slaves." Journal for Cultural Research 9, no. 2 (2005): 181. 
42 Idem. 
43 Idem, 182. 
44 Young-hwan Chong, “The Tokyo Trial and the Question of Colonial Responsibility: Zainichi Korean Reactions to Allied Justice in 
Occupied Japan*,” International Journal of Korean History (Vol.22 No.1), 2017, 79. 
45 Idem, 78. 
46 Park, "Silence,” 182. 
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SELF-CLAIMED “CULTURAL DNA” AND NATIONALISM 
 
Here, I analyze Japan’s self-Orientalism to further investigate and question aspects of 
constructed postwar Japanese national identity. This stresses the essential difference between 
Japan and the West. In order to construct a self-claimed exclusive national and cultural identity, I 
also focus on the “Japan Brand Strategy”—what Nancy Snow terms “Gross National 
Propaganda”47—which exploits Japanese popular culture through a Western-Orientalist lens as a 
mechanism for national mobilization to revitalize patriotic pride.  
 
As cited in Michal Daliot-Bul’s “Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of 'Cool Japan' and the Challenges 
of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age,” the 2007 strategic program’s explanation of the “Japan 
Brand Strategy” clearly reflects the function of cultural diplomacy as a cultural renovation 
strategy to recruit feelings for national ends: 
 
In order to build a “beautiful country of Japan” that is trusted, respected, and loved in the 
world, and for the Japanese themselves to re-acknowledge and re-appreciate the 
“attractiveness” of Japan, we must improve the “cultural creativity” of our country and as a 
nation establish and reinforce an attractive Japan Brand. Then, we must actively 
disseminate abroad [this image of] an attractive Japan.48 
 
The rehabilitation of national pride in Japan becomes a major concern for the Japanese 
government. The strengthening of national pride through cultural renovation is the prerequisite 
for Japan to participate in the global arena, for Japan to be successful both economically and 
politically.  
The “Japan Brand Strategy” seeks to tell Japanese people that Japanese technology can prosper 
due to its own “uniqueness,” while being under the scrutiny of the Western world. Koichi 
Iwabuchi cites in his essay that one policymaker of the project emphasized the necessity to 
“revisit Japan to consider how to properly discern Japanese cultural DNA and strategically 
standardize it, to successfully input it into Japanese products and services.”49  
The government’s interest in promoting essentialized notions of Japanese culture confirms 
Japan’s “distinctive” cultural aesthetics, styles, and tastes using the term “Cultural DNA”50. This 
idea of “pure originality” primarily emerged as a counter-narrative to Japan’s infamous ability to 
 
47 Nancy Snow, ‘Uncool Japan: Japan's Gross National Propaganda,” Metropolis, Issue 1024, 7 November 2013, 
https://metropolisjapan.com/uncool-japan/. 
48 Michal Daliot-Bul, “Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of 'Cool Japan' and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age,” 
Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 12, no. 2 (2009): 261. 
49 Iwabuchi, "Pop-Culture,”428. 
50 Koichi Iwabuchi, "Against Banal Inter-Nationalism," Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 41, no. 5 (2014): 447. 
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imitate the West. Throughout history, Japan has borrowed visual formations of foreign 
cultures—from Asian (mainly Chinese) to Euro-American cultures.51 As a result, Japan has often 
been called “a nation of copiers,” a decidedly pejorative connotation.52 However, this self-
claimed new “originality” eventually became internalized by Japan, along with the marketable 
version of Japaneseness. It is evident that this cultural policy promotes a specific sense of 
cultural identity, and such a claim can be interpreted as an attempt at re-enhance Japanese 
national identity by means of a celebrated ethnic essence.  
This idea of Japan’s “pure originality” is also emboldened by the myth of Japan being a 
homogeneous and “culturally unique”53 country which is reflected in the primary issue of 
Multicultural Co-living policy discussions in Japan. Iwabuchi asserts that Japan’s Multicultural Co-
living policy principally deals with recent immigrants by keeping intact the rigid bi-polarized 
conception of “Japanese” and “foreigners,” while disregarding long-time citizens with diverse 
cultural backgrounds: Zainichi (Korean descent), Ainu (East Asian ethnic group indigenous to 
Japan; the original inhabitants of Hokkaido and nearby Russian territories), Ryukyuans (East Asian 
ethnic group native to the Ryukyu Islands which stretch between the islands of Kyushu and 
Taiwan), Burakumin people (a former untouchable group in Japan at the bottom of the 
traditional social hierarchy); the list goes on.54 This dichotomized, ahistorical construction of 
culturally coherent entities not only occludes socio-cultural differences and disavows 
marginalized groups existence as constitutive of the nation further, but strengthens the 
country’s imaginary ethnic purity. Through the “Japan Brand Strategy”—the government-owned 
production site of “Cool Japan” imagery—we can presume that cultural nationalism has 
transformed into ethnic nationalism. 
 
 “WHITE” JAPAN AND ASIA AS AN UNDESIRABLE “OTHER” 
Identities are shaped through the construction of “Others” whose differences from the “Self” are 
emphasized.55 In this section, I trace the construction of whiteness within Japanese identity 
through my own observation and scholarly analysis. I focus on how the strategic binary 
opposition between the “West” and “Japan” has been complemented by a third party of an 
imaginary, undesirable “Asia.” Scholarly analysis by Masao Miyoshi, H. D. Harootunian, Iwabuchi, 
and Daliot-Bul informs my understanding of what constitutes “Japaneseness.”  
 
51 Kazuko Kameda‐Madar, “Copying and Theory in Edo-Period Japan (1615–1868),” Art History, September 2014, 709, DOI: 
10.1111/1467-8365.12111. 
52 Idem. 
53 Fisher, “The Japan country report,” 4. 
54 Iwabuchi, "Against Banal Inter-Nationalism," 447. 
55 Bukh; Suzuki; Hagstrom; Neumann. 
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As a Japanese who lived in England and is now based in Canada, I am categorized simply as 
“Asian.” I realized that many Japanese living in Japan do not see themselves as such. This is not 
unexpected considering that the term “Asia,” generally used to describe all the lands lying to the 
east of Europe, is elusive.  
Nevertheless, what I found surprising is the fact that many Japanese associate the term “Asian” 
with “exotic” racial attributes. This is shown in Seow Boon Tay’s survey conducted between 2005 
and 2009, in which she asked Japanese participants to list, freely, any number of words they 
associate with Asia (figure 3). The result suggests that there is a strong association of “Asia” with 
highly visual content such as racial attributes, i.e., black hair, thin eyes, short people, and other 
anachronistic representations. Ironically, these are the stereotypical and racist descriptive 




Figure. 4: “Images of Asia” from Seow Boon Tay’s "Asia: Through Japanese Lens Asian Identity among Japanese and 




Furthermore, the term “Japanese” is occasionally used in contrast with racial terms such as 
“black” and “white” in Japan, implying that some consider “Japanese” as a race. After its defeat 
in World War II, ruling elites and public intellectuals portrayed Japan as a tan’itsu kokka 
(homogenous nation) in public discourses. Yuko Kawai, in her article "Deracialised Race, 
Obscured Racism: Japaneseness, Western and Japanese Concepts of Race, and Modalities of 
Racism," gives the example of Shiga Shigetaka, the chief editor of the nationalist magazine 
Nihonjin, who stressed Japan’s geography, landscape, and climate in defining kokusui 
(Japaneseness) and claimed that “the Yamato minzoku has created, developed, purified, 
inherited, and preserved it [Japaneseness] from ancient times until the present day.”56 Kawai 
claims that language was also a key element of the “homogenous” Japanese minzoku (ethnic 
group), exemplified in statements made by Ueda Kazutoshi—a key figure in constructing kokugo, 
Japan’s national language at the turn of the twentieth century. Ueda called kokugo “Japanese 
spiritual blood,” indispensable to Japan’s kokutai (fundamental national character), comparing 
the Japanese language to blood—a biological material indispensable to life—pertained to the 
racialization of the Japanese as a group with a common language: a blood-tie.57 
 
This logic underlines the exclusivity of Japaneseness. As such, minority groups in Japan, especially 
people of Asian descent, have endured discriminatory practices involving a complex dynamic of 
assimilation and exclusion. For instance, immediately after the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake, the 
Kantō Massacre took place. The Japanese military, police and vigilantes massacred an estimated 
6,000 Korean and 174 Chinese residents of the Kantō region.58 The massacre occurred over a 
period of three weeks starting on September 1, 1923, the day when a massive earthquake struck 
the Kantō region. At the same time, a rumor quickly spread that some “futei senjin (malcontent 
Koreans)” utilized the chaos to set fires, poison wells and rape women in the disaster region, and 
numerous Japanese people organized themselves into vigilantes and lynched every suspect they 
encountered on the streets.59 Although the massacre was denied by Japanese authorities almost 
immediately after it occurred, it was celebrated by certain elements in the Japanese public. 
Today, some continue to deny that the massacre occurred while some Japanese right-wing 
groups celebrate the massacre. This exclusionary sentiment lives on; Asian minorities, such as 
zainichi Koreans, have been pressured to adopt a Japanese-style name in their everyday lives, 
and racist comments are often casually made in public. This racism also relates to how many 
Japanese today fail to empathize with other oppressed non-Whites such as Asians in the West, 
 
56 Yuko Kawai, "Deracialised Race, Obscured Racism: Japaneseness, Western and Japanese Concepts of Race, and Modalities of 
Racism," Japanese Studies 35, no. 1 (2015): 31. 
57 Kawai, "Deracialised Race,” 31. 





and Black Americans. For instance, historic fights for racial equality such as Black Lives Matter 
unfold right under many of their noses today.  
 
Although they lack awareness, some Japanese exhibit traits of “whiteness.” In “White Women, 
Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness,” Ruth Frankenberg asserts that whiteness 
“refers to a set of locations that are historically, socially, politically, and culturally produced and, 
moreover, are intrinsically linked to unfolding relations of domination”60. Frankenberg articulates 
the pressing need to identify this color‐coded category, asserting that “naming whiteness 
displaces it from the unmarked, unnamed status that is itself an effect of its dominance. Among 
the effects on white people both of race privilege and of the dominance of whiteness are their 
“seeming normativity and their structured invisibility.”61 Steve Garner, in his book “Whiteness: 
An Introduction,” details an approach to analyzing whiteness in five points: 
 
“White” is a marked racialized identity whose precise meanings derive from national 
racial regimes; 2) Whiteness as an identity exists only in so far as other racialized 
identities, such as blackness, Asianness, etc., exist; 3) Whiteness has been conceptualized 
over the century or so since it was first used, as terror, systemic supremacy, 
absence/invisibility, norms, cultural capital, and contingent hierarchies; 4) Whiteness is 
also a problematic, or an analytical perspective: that is, a way of formulating questions 
about social relations; 5) The invocation of white identities may suspend other social 
divisions and link people who share whiteness to dominant social locations, even though 
the actors are themselves in positions of relative powerlessness.62 
 
Frankenberg and Garner both stress that the power of whiteness resides in its normativity, its 
invisibility, its cultural capital, and its parasitical relationship to conceptualizations of other 
racialized identities. Their theorization of whiteness supports my understanding of postwar 
Japanese identity, which fails to recognize its own race and wants to achieve whiteness. I aim to 
hyper-visualize the power and privilege that whiteness holds, which is sometimes internalized, 
unmarked, and invisible. 
 
Japan’s whiteness, along with its high-handed attitude towards “Asia,” can be traced back to 
prewar Japan’s two major approaches toward Asia: Datsua Nyūō (breaking away from Asia and 
entering Europe), and kōa (co-prosperity with Asia). Seow claims, since the establishment of the 
Datsua Nyūō slogan, which took precedence in Japan toward the end of the 19th century, Japan 
sustained its perception of the imaginary entity of “Asia” as an inferior region to distance itself 
from the rest of the continent, and justified its role as the leader of the region by constructing 
 
60 Frankenberg, White Women, 6. 
61 Idem. 
62 Steve Garner. Whiteness: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2007), 2-3. 
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the regions of “Asia,” “Japan,” and the “West.”63 The concept of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere was mooted in 1940 by the foreign minister of the time, Matsuoka Yosuke. 
While appearing to call for Asian countries to stand in solidarity as allies against the “West,” it 
focused once again on Japan’s role as a leader in the region. Eventually, the concept became 
another form of justification for Japan’s high-handed attitude towards its Asian colonies, and 
further strengthened Japan’s sense of purpose in reigning over Asia.64 
 
As Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian assert, “Japan’s alienation from the non-West is based 
on Japan’s refusal to articulate its relationship to the non-West, especially Asia, both in the past 
and the present. To this day, Japan has not accepted the responsibility of accurately accounting 




Here, I discuss how Japan’s sense of superiority over other Asian countries has been re-asserted 
through the “Japan Brand Strategy” which was executed specifically to induce amnesia in regard 
to Japan’s war time crimes to other Asian countries.  
 
Iwabuchi attests in his article that on a global scale, the strategy was propelled by a desire to 
soften anti-Japan perceptions, notably in Southeast Asia;66 Iwabuchi points out, in the 1970s, 
when Japanese economic clout induced friction with the US and aroused anti-Japanese 
sentiments and movements in Southeast Asia, a renewed “Cool Japan” policy began to take 
action to soften the anti-Japan mood.  
 
By developing, packaging, and selling an essentialized notion of Japanese culture, the “Japan 
Brand Strategy” created a “liberated” and “humane” image of postwar Japan. Daliot-Bul 
contends that this had a particular effect upon younger generations in other Asian countries who 
had not experienced earlier Japanese imperialism.67 By building the new Japan brand around a 
cultural “essence” found in Japanese tradition and culture, the policy ignored, in an ethnocentric 
fashion, that for millions in Asia Japan's cultural tradition was associated with its history of 
imperial aggressiveness in the region.68  
 
63 Boon Tay, Seow. "Asia: Through Japanese Lens Asian Identity among Japanese and Images of Asia on Japanese Television”, Keio 
Communication Review No. 32 (2010): 105. 
64 Idem. 
65 Miyoshi, Masao, and H. D. Harootunian, "Japan in the World," Boundary 2 18, no. 3 (1991): 1-7. 
66 Iwabuchi, "Pop-Culture Diplomacy," 420. 





As Daliot-Bul states, unlike the image of “Japan” as it emerges from contemporary popular 
culture products, the new national imagery promoted by the “Japan Brand” is not of cutting-
edge culture, but of a country with a “clean record,” in which Japan’s present seamlessly 
emerges from a past with no shadows .69 He claims that this is an effort at political capitalization, 
coercively manipulated out of an otherwise disinterested consumer trend. By binding Japan’s 
past, policy makers in Japan believe that the success of Japanese popular culture in Asia can be 
used to induce a “collective amnesia” with regard to Japan's colonial past and to launch Japan 
into a new political future in the region.70 
 
CONSTRUCTED “MEMORY” 
Postwar Japan’s relation to its past is filled with tension. As Igarashi states, Japanese society 
rendered its traumatic experiences of the war and its defeat comprehensible through narrative 
devices that downplayed their disruptive effects on Japan’s history.71 But Japan as a nation has 
also been downplaying the atrocities (and their effects) committed by the Empire of Japan in 
Asian-Pacific countries during the period Japanese imperialism, primarily during the Second Sino-
Japanese War and World War II.  
In this section, I contend that the Japanese government’s desire to maintain a sanitized and 
acceptable past, along with the content expectations Japan adopted encouraged by the 
dominant Western powers, governs the false “memory” implanted in the Japanese that 
contributes to the construction of Japanese identity. As Cassandra L. Jones notes, “individual or 
group memory selects certain landmarks of the past—places, artworks, dates; persons, public or 
private, well known or obscure, real or imagined—and invests them with symbolic and political 
significance.”72 Memory is divergent, reiterative, and multiple—it is in a sense, a borrowed 
concept. Memory does not exist outside of the boundaries of history.73 
As discussed in the introduction, postwar Japanese identity is “attained.” It is inherently under 
the influence of the dominant power of the US. It is also underlined by Japan’s desire to imbue 




71 Igarashi, “Bodies of Memory,” 1. 
72 Cassandra L Jones, "Memory and Resistance: Doro's Empire, Mary's Rebellion, and Anyanwu as Lieu De Mémoire in Octavia E. 
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73 Igarashi, “Bodies of Memory,” 5. 
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defines as “tertiary retentions”—exteriorized forms of information that are passed on to 
construct their cultural and national identities.74  
Stiegler, concerned with the ways in which contemporary digital media networks produce a 
conditioning field for human experience, cognition, and behavior, claims that the 
“colonization”75 of tertiary retentions by economic or industrial forces influences the formation 
of internalized perception. He asserts that the internalized perception then enables the 
formation of individual and collective identity. He describes a “retentional chain reaction” in 
which the increasingly dominant presence of industrialized tertiary retentions occurs when “the 
symbols, images and sounds available to us are increasingly provided by commercialized culture 
industries.”76 They begin to condition our individual and collective forms of secondary 
retention—our selves, and cultural memory.  
As Shunya Yoshimi states, there has been a strong linkage between television and nationalism in 
contemporary Japan. TV entered households in the early 1960s and became an overarching 
medium: linking individuals with the state, defining the national consciousness, and dominating 
people’s imaginative views of both the past and the present of Japan.77  
In other words, what Stiegler calls “the replacement of collective imaginaries and individual 
stories,”78 with the forms of homogenized memory we find in commercial spaces—such as the 
“Cool Japan” images which circulate on the television, internet, or media—impacts not only the 
constitution of our individual memory, but also, in turn, our process of perception and selection. 
“It patterns what we choose to pay attention to and what we care for and what we care 
about.”79 Stiegler states that the particular, coerced attention of the audience is conditioned by 
the retentional systems. He suggests that the expanded influence of industrialized tertiary 
retentions holds power over the constitution of a sense of self, as well as our capacity to envision 
our collective future(s). Individuals constitute themselves in relation to a group through the 
inheritance of a pre-individual reality, memory, or history. In Stiegler’s terms:  
“The I, as psychic individual, cannot be thought except to the extent that it belongs to a 
we, which is a collective individual: the I constitutes itself through the adoption of a 
collective history, which it inherits and with which a plurality of Is identify.”80  
 
Hence, individuation is a complex dynamic of subject formation in which the individual, in the 
 
74 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Beardsworth, R, Collins, G (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
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76 Idem. 
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process of self-constitution, draws from a collective reservoir of “memory.” The Japanese are 
under the influence of Japan’s circulation of an essentialized notion of Japan, which citizens 
download from the repository of ahistorical and acceptable “memory” in the media in order to 
constitute their national and cultural identities. 
 
“COLONIZED” JAPANESE IDENTITIES LIVE FOREVER: THE 
JAPANESE STATE’S DATA COLONIZATION 
 
My project critiques the social and ideological biases manifested in both “whiteness”81 and male 
domination that inform postwar Japanese identity as well as the agendas of digital technologies. 
“Dreams Come True Very Much” is informed by the “Moonshot Research & Development 
Program” proposed by the Cabinet Office of Japan, a project currently under development. 
There are three aspects to this program that I address in my project: the underlying nationalism, 
Japan’s “subordinate’s double identification”—Japan playing America’s “Japan”—and the 
colonization of life (removing death from life) as the ultimate form of violence. In this section, I 
unpack how the Japanese state plans on using digital technologies as renewed forms of 
oppression in the post- “Moonshot Research & Development Program,” AI-driven future.  
Dubbed J F Kennedy’s lunar program, also known as the Apollo project, this program is modelled 
on large-scale projects such as the European Commission’s programme Horizon Europe and the 
US National Science Foundation (NSF) programme. It seeks to deepen Japan’s partnership with 
Euro-American countries to boost its faltering global research profile and keep ahead of China—
Japan’s emerging “Other”—while tackling domestic issues such as Japan’s shrinking and rapidly 
aging population, coupled with the biggest debt in the developed world relative to the size of its 
economy. The Japanese government proposes to create “Society 5.0” by 2050, wherein a single 
person controls up to ten avatars at once to “maximize their productivity,” to "be more resistant 
to stress,” and to "improve individuals QoL.”82 The proposal states that it will be possible to 
“extract human thoughts,” and that by “analyzing the brain information” they will “model the 
thinking itself of individuals—such as human brain recognition and decision-making—and 
reproduce it on a computer to artificially improve the model.”83  
 
There are two aspects to this program that I shed light on in my project: the underlying 
nationalism, and Japan playing America’s “Japan”84 and the colonization of life. Essentially, the 
 
81 Frankenberg, White Women, 6. 
82 Cabinet Office, “Moonshot International Symposium Initiative Report,” https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/stmain/mspaper3.pdf. 
83 Idem, 13. 
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government is attempting to multiply Japanese national identity: with a life’s worth of data from 
every citizen, the Japanese state can practically eliminate the death of the Japanese people, as 
information lives forever. Identity is information with self-awareness. The government uploads 
the individual’s data up to the point of their physical death to a machine that thinks it is the 
individual; thus, Japanese national identity lives on; it can be kept fully intact—in the sense that 
identities that are saved as “Japanese” data will therefore always be “Japanese”—solving the 
issue of the nation’s population decline without taking immigrants. In this scenario, a Japanese 
person, or at least a Japanese person’s identity, can work forever for the nation. The sets of data 
(people’s identities) will be used by the State to perform tasks. Japan is a self-proclaimed 
homogenous nation; this program would solidify that claim even further. The colonization of life 
(removing death from life), is perhaps, the ultimate form of violence.  
 
This colonization of life can be understood through what Paola Ricaurte calls “data 
colonialism,”85 the "commodification of human life as data and its establishment of an order 
mediated by data relation.”86 As Judy Waijcman has argued, the desire to create and control 
technology is fundamentally a realm dominated by whiteness and maleness, and thus 
technology itself may inherently be patriarchal.87 Ricaurte asserts that in the patriarchal world, 
where “data extractivism” assumes that everything to be a data source, uneven distributions of 
power materialize as digital colonization, algorithmic violence, gender violence, class divides, and 
racism, among other forms of violence.88 She contests that data-centered economies foster 
“extractive models of resource exploitation, the violation of human rights, cultural exclusion, and 
ecocide,” and that “data colonialism” materializes especially in “multiethnic countries with high 
levels of social inequality outside of Western context”89—which Japan fits into.  
 
Further, Ricaurte claims that these countries are at greater risk of double or triple 
marginalization through digital technologies due to the process of colonization that reproduces 
injustice within countries and enacts violence on gendered and racialized bodies, which erases 
“alternate visions of the world”90. She asserts that this leads to technology continuing to operate 
as a renewed form of oppression.91 She explains how governments and public institutions act as 
central forces in the process of internal and international data colonization at the systemic level 
by: 
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“1) developing legal frameworks, 2) designing public policy, 3) using artificial intelligence 
systems for public administration, 4) hiring technological services, 5) acquiring products 
for public administration and surveillance purposes, 6) implementing public policies and 
digital agendas, and 7) facilitating education and the development of labor forces.”92  
Ricaurte’s analysis of the modes of oppression mediated by data, offers an insight into possible 
futures of Japan(s), where “historical forms of colonization”93 are likely to be amplified. 
 
The nationalistic nature of Japan’s “Moonshot” program was also straightforwardly highlighted 
at the “Setting ‘Moonshots’ on Target: U.S.-Japan Strategies for National Technology 
Investment,” a panel organized by key thought leaders behind this program. Patricia Falcone, a 
Deputy Director for Science and Technology and Chief Technology Officer at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, stated at the panel: “likeminded allies like Japan and the US can build ties,” 
so when they are “in crisis, they can bring the shared strength of their system of science and 
technology to national needs.”94 Many of the issues Falcone explored in the paper “U.S.-Japan 
Technology Policy Coordination: Balancing Technonationalism with a Globalized World,” which 
emphasizes the urgent necessity for Japan and the US to “effectively balance the imperatives of 
technonationalism and globalization” to compete with China—one of “the main protagonists in 
this technologically driven competition.”95 
 
CHINA AS THE EMERGING “OTHER” 
Today, Japan’s relations with China, their emerging socio-political hegemon, have become a 
nationalist focal point for both Left and Right, insofar as both sides demand that Japan resist 
China as a means to protect Japanese national interests. Shogo Suzuki asserts that the 
convergence of both the Japanese Left’s and Right’s images of China to indicate that the PRC is 
the emerging “Other” in both sides’ attempts to construct Japan’s identity.96 The common Other 
had been the US, as idealists of both the Right and Left agreed that the US was “an arrogant 
hegemon”97 that forced Japan to adopt policies that were in direct opposition to their respective 
images of a desirable Japanese “Self.”  
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However, Suzuki claims that both the Japanese Left and Right now use the Chinese “Other” 
toward different ends, i.e., the idealist Right camp points to the PRC’s use of the “history card 
and high-handed manner” in territorial disputes to “highlight Japan’s weakness and subservient 
identity”98, thus pushing for their project of rearming Japan and embarking on a more 
independent security policy. China is now confronted as a matter of principle to overcome the 
“emasculated” identity that has characterized Japan’s postwar state.99 This emasculation of 
Japanese identity is a result of Japan’s “makeover” by the US. After Japan’s defeat, the US 
transformed itself as a new superpower in the mid-twentieth century. Japan was reimagined by 
the US; Japan is no longer “threatening,” it is now “inoffensive.”100 This went hand in hand with 
the shift of Emperor Hirohito’s status in the US, which was directed by MacArthur and the 
Truman administration to “westernize” the emperor who was universally hated in the US during 
the war. He was transformed from an “archetypical Oriental villain” who possessed deviant 
masculinity, to an emasculated “symbol of openness to Western ideas and culture,” and “a 
paternalistic figure, leading the pliable, immature Japanese through the process of political and 
social maturation.”101 He became the face of Japan where the Americans’ could project their 
hopes for smooth and successful occupation.  
By contrast, the Left in Japan uses a “bullying China” to highlight Japan’s “moral” and “peaceful” 
nature, thus emphasizing the need for Japan not to stray from its post-1945 pathway of 
development. China has become the powerful “Other” that Japan feels wariness towards, which 
is evident in Japan’s unprecedented scale of investment in projects such as the “Moonshot 
Program,” in which the primary motive is to compete with China along with its “ally,” the US. The 
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SHANZHAI (山寨) AND JAPANESENESS 
 
In this section, I discuss Byun Chul-Han’s conceptualization of deconstruction in Chinese, 
shanzhai, to rethink Japanese identities as delinked from the idea of “pure originality”102 and 
internalized Orientalism, and to imagine futurities of Japan(s). 
 
Throughout history, Japan has borrowed visual formations from foreign cultures, mainly Chinese 
to Euro-American, in order to establish its own cultural configurations.103 As Kemeda-Madar 
claims, the nation has been called a “nation of copiers” with a pejorative connotation, as the act 
and works resulting from utushi (copy, duplicate, replica, etc.) have been denigrated as lacking in 
originality.104  
 
As I discussed in “Japan’s Self-Claimed ‘Cultural DNA’ and Nationalism,” Japan’s self-Orientalism, 
accumulated through its popular-culture diplomacy, functions as a mechanism in order to 
construct an exclusive national and cultural identity. The government’s interest in promoting 
essentialized notions of Japanese culture confirms Japan’s “distinctive” cultural aesthetics, styles, 
and tastes using the metaphor of “cultural DNA.”105 This idea of “pure originality” primarily 
emerged as a counter-narrative to Japan’s infamous ability to imitate the West; however, this 
self-claimed new “originality” was eventually internalized by the Japanese.  
 
For instance: in 2019, for the era’s name, Japan’s officials selected characters from “ancient 
Japanese poetry”106 instead of Chinese classics for the first time. This event highlights Japan’s 
eagerness to achieve a specific sense of exclusive cultural identity. The officials emphasized that 
the characters came from the “original Japanese classic,” the Poem of Manshu; however, there 
were textual criticisms by scholars who point out the anthology’s intellectual sources comes 
from Chinese poetry. This is an example of Japan’s effort to establish the country’s self-claimed 
distinctive “originality,” to discern itself from its history of borrowing visual formations from 
foreign cultures, mainly China—Japan’s socio-political hegemon. In my art project, using 
shanzhai (Chinese deconstruction) as a methodology, I explore probable Japan(s), and rethink 
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versions of Japanese national and cultural identities as something without an “original,” to 
undermine the essentialist logic behind them.  
 
The expression shanzhai (山寨), literally means "mountain fortress,” a modern Chinese 
neologism meaning "fake.” The word shanzhai has been present in Chinese language since 
ancient times in reference to mountain villages or stockades. Silvia Lindtner explains that the 
story of the expression’s current incarnation as “imitation” began with the appearance of forged 
cell phones sold under names such as Nokir and Samsing on the market.107 This was made 
possible by a relaxation of regulations in 2006 that allowed Taiwanese company MediaTek to 
import mobile phone chipsets. As a result, any person could start a production line of cellphone 
by assembling components. Over the course of 2008, shanzhaiji—meaning items that imitate 
more expensive models, cheap, and reliable, were widely distributed.  
The expression shanzhai does not mean crude; indeed, it is hardly inferior, as shanzhai 
sometimes exceed the “original.” The shanzhai identity's inherent ambiguity—almost the same 
but not quite—brings with it a dimension of “disruption of authority”108 as it creates gaps in the 
systems of knowledge through which systems of domination are exercised. As Homi Bhabha puts 
it, “mimicry is at once resemblance and menace”109. His insight helps to explain the power 
of shanzhai identity that draws from both deconstructing and legitimizing the “authentic” targets 
it mimics. 
As philosopher Byun Chul Han asserts in his book, “Shanzhai: Deconstruction in Chinese,” if 
“truth” in the West operates through “exclusion” and “transcendence,” Chinese thought “uses a 
different technique that operates using inclusion and immanence.”110 Han, starting from Hegel’s 
frustration with the Buddhist notion of emptiness, points out that emptiness in Chinese 
Buddhism means the negativity of decreation and absence. In contrast to Western notions of 
essentialism, deconstruction in Chinese is a starting point, not a reaction—it breaks radically with 
being and essence. Han connects this orientation to the Chinese awareness of time and history, 
as Chinese thought “does not recognize the kind of identity that is based on a unique event.”111 
In other words, in Chinese thought, the original is always already a trace, and “the trace always 
lets the artwork differ from itself.”112 “In classical Chinese, the original is called zhen ji […] This 
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literally means ‘the authentic trace’.”113 Han asserts that the fundamental notion in Chinese 
thought is not the unique Being, but the multiform, multilayered process.  
Han then gives the example of the ancient or classical Chinese work of art, which is always 
subject to transformation and whose authorship is much less clearly determinable. Often, a large 
part of the painting is left empty so that collectors can later add their seal stamps, situating the 
painting as trace in a conversation with others, and turning it into an open field of dialogue. 
Thus, Chinese thought breaks out of a monological notion of art: both individual and collective 
works are open to transformation. Han claims that “the Chinese artwork is empty and flat. It is 
without soul and truth.”114 In Chinese thought, if one has become what is considered to be the 
master’s equal, this is proof of one’s own mastership—there are no negative notions attached. 
For instance, Xie He 謝嚇 (c. 500–535), stated that a good painting transmits and conveys earlier 
models through copying.115 According to Xie He’s Sixth Law, there is no clear-cut distinction 
between “painting” and “copying”; in fact, it refers to “copying” as an element of “painting.” 
Han dares hope that shanzhai may bring in shanzhai democracy, since the shanzhai movement 
releases anti-authoritarian, subversive energies. Employing Han’s theorization of shanzhai as a 
methodology, my thesis project explores Japanese identities as something without an original, as 
shanzhai “disrupts fixed invariable essences or principles”116. 
IMAGINING FUTURES OF JAPAN(S): IDENTITIES AS 
CONTINGENT 
In my narrative-based project, I use shanzhai to rethink Japanese identities as delinked from the 
idea of “pure originality”117 and internalized Orientalism. My work uses critical science fiction 
narratives as a tool to disrupt current discourses surrounding Japanese identities. The static and 
deterministic structures of homogenous Japanese identity remain prevalent in contemporary 
Japan. By presenting not only Japanese identities but identities in general as malleable, 
contingent, and open to rearticulation, my work aims to illustrate how the unified category of 
Japanese, and humans in general, are categorically interpellated and performatively constituted 
through the discourses that constitute their lives. 
My narrative resists the notion of a constant, static Self. This partially comes from my own 
experience as a Japanese living abroad who, consciously and subconsciously, performs different 
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“I”s depending on the sociocultural contexts. I am constantly “re/organizing my sense of Self, 
Other, and the relationship between Self and Other.”118 As Wolff-Michael Roth and Hitomi 
Harama assert, “identity is a site of continuous struggle, arising from a multiplicity of situations 
and group-memberships leading to our experience of multiple marginalities, and which is, 
therefore, a source of monstrosity.”119 Stuart Hall also contents, “identities are never unified and 
increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, 
often intersecting, and antagonistic discourses, practices, and positions. They are subject to a 
radical historicization and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.”120 
To present identities as mutable, I use “Extrapolation: Neoliberal Speculative Fiction”121 and 
“Dark DeSign”122 as methodologies. Whereas “Extrapolation: Neoliberal Speculative Fiction” uses 
speculative fiction stories to extrapolate today’s free-market system to an extreme, weaving the 
narrative around hyper commodified aspects of human, “Dark DeSign” uses darkness and satire 
as an antidote to naive techno-utopianism. 
As Fredric Jameson contends, the purpose of science fiction is “not to give us ‘images’ of the 
future…but rather to defamiliarize and restructure our experience with our own present, and to 
do so in specific ways distinct from all other forms of defamiliarization.”123 The science fiction 
stories within my projects critique aspects of Japanese identities, but are not meant as plausible 
speculations about the future of Japan, or a post-“Moonshot” cyborgian world .  
An example of an author who uses science fiction to look critically at the present to speculate 
future(s) is Larissa Lai. “Salt Fish Girl” appropriates techno-Orientalist tropes in order to critique 
racist, sexist, and imperialist attitudes. Her narratives explore what it means to be gendered and 
racialized in an age when technology transcends geopolitical boarders and exists both outside 
and inside of the body. The non-human beings function sometimes as metaphors for the new 
“disposable” Asian worker in the era of globalization, sometimes as second-generation Asian 
immigrant in North America. Her strategically techno-Orientalized characters are not part of the 
exotic backdrop in some Westernized cyber-fantasy; they are at the center of the novel, leading 
the narrative. 
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RECONSTRUCTION   
WHAT CYBORGS CAN(’T) DO ABOUT JAPANESE IDENTITIES 
In this section, I discuss how much potential Donna Haraway’s cyber-fantasy of cyborgs really 
holds to dismantle categories of differences for people of color: specifically for Japanese women. 
Although Haraway’s “reconstructed imaginary”124 encourages a departure from traditional 
categories of difference, various critics claim that it is “fraught with a Western, patriarchal 
violence.”125 Julia R DeCook asserts that technology—including the cyborg, the transhuman, and 
the posthuman as identities that exist in a utopia, in a beyond—is a myth that is being 
perpetuated and shifted by those who already benefit from hegemonic paradigms of what 
counts as being human in the first place. In my project, I draw parallels to Haraway’s 
manifestation of cyborgs to aspects of constructed “Japaneseness,” aspects which come from a 
white-washed, amalgamation of information accumulated to rewrite cultural “memories.” To 
contextualize my understanding of “data colonialism,” I draw from writing of Paolo Ricaurte, Julia 
R DeCook, and Pratistha Bhattarai to enable my discussion of Japan’s “Moonshot Research & 
Development Program.” 
In her seminal work, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century,” Haraway claims that the cyborg, “a fusion of the organic and the 
technical forged in particular, historical, cultural practices,"126 is one that transcends Western 
dichotomies such as nature versus culture, body versus mind, female versus male, and animal 
versus human. She suggests that a woman of color "might be understood as a cyborg identity, a 
potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities and in the complex political-
historical layerings of her 'biomythography’”127, calling for more integration of feminist theories 
of women of color in analyzing identity and difference.  
However, various critics have pointed out that Haraway’s cyborgs’ theory fails to adequately 
represent feminist issues and concerns, despite the fact that her depictions of cyborgs seem to 
offer such a promise. In DeCook’s critique of Haraway, she claims that “the cyborg body is one 
that is littered with not only epistemic violence in regard to the foundations on which it is 
grounded (a Western philosophy of the self as well as Western views of science and technology), 
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but also in regard to class, race, sexuality, and ability.”128 She calls Haraway’s argument a futile 
attempt to “dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools.”129 
In “’Colonized Japanese Identities Live Forever: The Japanese State’s Data Colonization,” I 
introduced Paolo Ricaurte’s argument that the technological revolution of this century may have 
further reified and cemented differences between races, nationality, gender, along with other 
categories of difference. This can be supported by DeCook’s argument in which she claims that 
the epistemic groundings upon which much of science and technology and cyborg are built 
upon, are with violence. Technology and the desire to create and control machines is a realm 
dominated by Man, and thus technology itself may inherently be patriarchal.130  
Decook explains that during the time Haraway’s manifesto was written, the transhumanist 
movement started to formally organize, attempting to disseminate its ideology into the world. 
Today, the rise of the networked societies and the ability to shift and shape identities in 
cyberspace make the idea of the cyborg womxn more possible than ever. For instance, the 
government of Japan is proposing the “Moonshot Research & Development Program” in which 
they assert a near future where Japanese multiply themselves into both physical and virtual 
avatars.  
There is also a question about the accessibility to technology upon which the cyborg identity is 
built. For instance, according to the U.N.’s International Telecommunication Union, a gender gap 
in internet usage is particularly serious in the least-developed countries, as one in seven women 
were using the internet compared with one in five men. DeCook also gives an example of the 
current state in the US, where there is a severe divide between those who have access to 
technology and those who do not, and this unequal access exacerbates the social inequalities 
that they have often created (Shapiro, 2010). She claims that technology cannot exist outside of 
the material confines of space: “Even those who do not participate in the same uses of 
technology and who are unable to experience its benefits and thus, its potential, are affected by 
the changes in behavior, social norms, economics, and identity that it produces.”131 
DeCook also cites Pratistha Bhattarai’s argument in which Bhattarai argues that technology and 
cyborgs, since it is created by humans, carries with it the same limitations as humanity in terms 
of its ability to provide transcendence of our categorizations of race, class, gender, and ability.132 
Bhattarai claims that in fact, since the algorithm, or what she calls “source code,” is written from 
the epistemological standpoint and values of those who create it (white males), they are already 
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imbued with certain assumptions that come with categories of differences. Bhattarai claims that 
even investments in algorithms that seem benign reproduce a certain cultural logic of power in 
terms of knowledge, labor, and bodies.133 The idea of source code, of algorithms, of data being 
the genesis of action is naïve— “because their agency is enabled and constrained by a larger 
network of cultural and economic encodings that render them executable,”134 illuminating again, 
that attempts to make technology and the tech world more inclusive and diverse, as well as the 
attempts to use the category of cyborg as transcending difference, are merely the “master’s 
tools” disguised as revolutionary action.  
DeCook asks: “If the tech industry and tech world is heavily dominated by whiteness, by 
maleness, then in what capacity do those who do not fit into hegemonic notions of humanity 
(white, cis, hetero, male) figure into these infrastructural equations?”135 Epistemic sites of 
thought in the theorization of the cyborg exist within the same epistemic paradigms upon which 
all science and technology are built upon (colonialist, Western, white), and thus are limited in 
their capacities to fully conceptualize a utopia for womxn of color.  
To summarize, DeCook, along with Bhattarai and other theorists argue that Haraway’s 
conceptualization of cyborgs has continued to allow for the centering of whiteness and 
maleness, and a techno-utopic worldview where technology is seen to be emancipatory, rather 
than oppressive. DeCook attests that Haraway did encourage the embrace of new technologies 
as a means of liberation—however, today, we see the ways that technology continues to reify 
existing power structures, notably white supremacy, and misogyny. Haraway’s notion of the 
cyborg is deeply Western in its theorization, and leaves behind those (womxn, people of color, 
the disabled, queer persons) who do not exist in Western conceptualization of human-ness. 
In my satirical projects, cyborg—originally a military invention that held in its very essence the 
idea of war—functions as a metaphor to critique the whiteness of Japanese identity. I parallel 
cyborgs with what constructs “Japaneseness,” which is propaganda. Like hardware, it is 
manufactured, mass-produced, then advertised, much like the empty idea of a whitewashed 
“Cool Japan,” using detailed reconstructions of the selective appropriation of products and 
culture in order to create a new cultural imagery for Japan. By creating this parallel, I critique the 
aspects of constructed “Japaneseness” that come from whitewashing and creating false 
“memories,” much like how viruses infiltrate data bases. This data, now infected, is then used to 
construct whitewashed Japanese cultural and national identity. 
The cyborgs in my narratives are not detached from the realities of violence that derive from 
race, class, gender, and ability. In fact, they carry with them the same limitations as humanity, 
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since the biased epistemological standpoints and values are imbued in the fundamentals of 
technology. For instance, in my narrative-based film, “Dreams Come True Very Much,” how the 
cyborgs of Maari Sugawara (me) interact with their subjective realities is based on one set of 
data that constitutes one identity.  
POLITICS OF TRANSLATION: “POETIC OF RAVINE” (詩的な
峡谷) AS A TOOL FOR DEFAMILIARIZATION 
Here, I discuss how cyborgian subjective reality along with strategic translation becomes a tool 
for defamiliarization. I explore the political dimensions of translation by discussing theories by 
Gayatri Spivak, Wolff-Michael Roth and Hitomi Harama. I also introduce Yoko Tawada’s use of 
the “poetic ravine” (詩的な峡谷) which allows her writing to fall into the liminal space between 
language A and language B.  
What Tawada calls the “poetic ravine” is an in-between, non-conformist space. It is a “third” 
place, or, to borrow Homi Bhaba’s term, a space that resounds with the echoes of both 
languages—an ideal space for translators, or those who drifts in liminal spaces—between 
categorizations of differences. I use Tawada’s “poetic ravine” as a methodology. For me, 
strategic translation functions as a tool to critique essentialist notions of identity. It also helps me 
visualize the link between languages as well as national and cultural identities. In order to bring 
attention to the political aspects of language and translation; to exploit literal and figurative 
layers of signification; and to draw attention to language itself—its fluidity, and its sociopolitical 
nature—while highlighting that “loss” in translation is inevitable, I employ a writing style the 
defamiliarizes the relationship between the word and its meaning. In my narrative-based project 
“Dreams Come True Very Much,” wordplay extends and deconstructs idioms and proverbs to 
resist essentialist notions of identity. 
For instance, I translate Japanese idiomatic expressions while exploiting the literal meaning. 
Inspired by Tawada’s use of wordplays, the expression “souma tou no you ni kioku gayomigaeru 
(走馬灯のように記憶が蘇る),” which literally means “memories revive like a lantern,” means, 
figuratively, “life flashing before your eyes before death.” The word for lantern(走馬灯) consists 
of three kanjis; to run (走), horse (馬), light, lamp, torch (灯). By taking grammatical concepts 
literally, I play with the idea of the Avatar-Ms seeing horses running around them, as they fight 



















Figure 3. Film stills from Dreams Come True Very Much (2021) 
 
I also play with words that have the same reading compounds. For instance, in the opening of 
“Dreams Come True Very Much,” where the Avatar-Ms are “watching Japan sliding on the 
conveyor belt…and before [they] knew it, what was Japan had become a god,” images on the 
screen depicts not only the metamorphosizing kami (神: god), but kami (髪: hair), kami (紙: 
paper), and kani (蟹: crab). My intention is to make the audiences reflect on the language itself, 
or question the “naturalness” of the languages we use. Gayatri Spivak, to decipher these 
metaphors or idiomatic expression that get lost in the translated text, calls for the development 
of “love and affinity” to the text by the translators, and states the translator must “surrender” to 
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Figure 4. Film stills from Dreams Come True Very Much (2021) 
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My poem and some parts of this thesis were first written in Japanese then translated to English. 
The idea of writing the poem in Japanese first, came to my mind after I exchanged emails with 
Ayumi Goto, a Japanese Canadian artist, who gave me insights into how languages affect one’s 
creative and critical directions: 
“i have a friend/colleague from Tokyo who did her phd in the same department as 
me. she was working on sex trade work and Asian diasporic illegal work in 
Yokohama. her research was so important, yet she disclosed to me that she never 
discussed her research in Japan. this concerned me because of how her input 
might support non-Japanese citizens working in very vulnerable positions. i 
wonder sometimes how one's language can be used for self-censure, especially as 
a Japanese woman working on topics that would contest the social status quo. だ
から英語と日本語使いながら自分の研究を素直に辿いてください。” 
Goto’s remark relates to Japan’s aforementioned ethnocentric and patriarchal socio-political 
structure, that disavows marginalized groups existence as constitutive of the nation. This 
structure silences the subalterns—womxn, non-Japanese citizens, and other minority groups—in 
order to establish Japan as a country with a clean record. Her colleague’s episode also proves 
how intense haji (the concept of publish shaming) is in Japan. This sensitivity towards shaming is 
not “natural” but is constructed: Japanese schools imbue rigorous notions of propriety into 
children from an early age. Such sensitivity to public shaming is so intense in Japan that 
imaginary gaze alone tends to suffice to generate shame which occasionally leads to self-
censorship. What underlies haji is the code whereby individuals are expected to not violate 
norms.  
The episode led me to consider what languages do to me, and what I can do to languages. It is 
with language that we construct our ideas of the world. In a sense, one is confined to the 
language(s) that they use. For instance, the state usually imposes one language with the aim of 
more effectively administering its subjects and unifying the nation. As a way of freeing myself 
from the oppression that both languages impose on their users, during my writing process of the 
poem and this thesis, I switched between the languages that I use to the one I am most 
comfortable with, depending on the context. As Roth and Harama state, switching between two 
languages has been “deeply uprooting, self-transforming,”137 and has an impact to my 
experience of self. Using another language brings with it a drastically-changing sense of identity, 
as using more than one language further complicates the constantly-mutating nature of identity. 
My relationship with the languages I use is stated in my work: 
When I write in English, there is a hole, its mouth is wide open, waiting to eat me.  
Perhaps it is not a feeling—maybe, there is a hole sucking me in.  
Like a vagina.  
 
137 Idem, 763. 
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Except nothing comes out.  
  
I wrote this in Japanese.  
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Figure 5: Floor plan for Maari Sugawara’s MFA thesis exhibition Dreams Come True Very Much 
A1 





DREAMS COME TRUE VERY MUCH 
 
Figure 6. Installation View of the exhibition Dreams Come True Very Much, 2021 
My thesis exhibition “Dreams Come True Very Much” consists of five components: a short film 
(which is split into two), two video works, an audio-visual installation, and a projection mapping 
of AI-generated “Japanese” faces onto a Noh mask. The film “Dreams Come True Very Much” 
serves as the basis for the overall narrative, introducing the Avatar-Ms and setting featured in 
other works.  
Most of my projects are digitally projected images. This mode of presentation suggests 
transience or impermanence; the audience cast shadows onto the projection’s surfaces. These 
shadows ostensibly become part of one’s experience of the artwork.  
The projects are located in order to create a circle that mirrors Avatar-Ms' existence, her raison 
d’être is perpetuity; there is no end, the video of her continues to play, much like the avatars in 
the post-“Moonshot” world, where there is not death and only existence. Although there is an 
overarching narrative structure to this exhibition, this exhibition itself has no beginning, middle, 
or end. For instance, projected images fade into one another and the themes echo each other. 
Each grounded in a socio-political context, my projects resonate with one another. 
To create an intimate feeling, commonplace consumer products such as plastic boxes, water 
bottles, and a TV are placed in the exhibition space. Also, to hint at one of the underlying themes 
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of my work—3.11, which still leaves scar after a decade—the space is punctuated by translucent 
plastic boxes that are stacked up and scattered throughout the space.  
 













DREAMS COME TRUE VERY MUCH: THE ANIMATION 
 
Figure 8. Film still from Dreams Come True Very Much, 2011 
By presenting, not only Japanese identities but identities as a whole as malleable, this short film 
seeks to illustrate how the unified categories of Japanese and human are categorically 
interpellated and performatively constituted through discourse. This film critiques the social and 
ideological biases manifested in both “whiteness” and male domination that inform postwar 
Japanese identity as well as the agendas of digital technologies.  
The backstory of the project is informed by the “Moonshot Research & Development Program” 
proposed by the Cabinet Office of Japan, in which the government asserts a near future where 
Japanese people will multiply themselves into both physical and virtual avatars. Emphasizing the 
political and social possibilities of AI in post-“Moonshot” world, my work unpacks how the 
Japanese state plans to use digital technologies as renewed forms of oppression. My work seeks 
to defamiliarize and restructure our experiences with the current Japanese socio-political 
environments and our present. There are three aspects to this program that I address: the 
underlying nationalism, Japan’s “subordinate’s double identification”—Japan playing America’s 





Set in a virtual space, the narrative follows a theme of yearning and longing for “Japan(s)” in the 
minds of the Avatar-Ms—cybernetic avatars of myself. The story takes place in a post-
“Moonshot” future, where Japan has vanished after an unspecified man-made catastrophe; no 
one has seen Japan ever since. The Japanese, shamed by their history, are scattered around the 
world. Before Japan vanished, the government established the “Moonshot” program to create 
“Society 5.0,” a notion of a society that integrates cyberspace and physical space to realize 
economic growths. Each Japanese was suggested by the government to have ten avatars, and 
most Japanese multiplied themselves to “improve productivity” and become “more resistant to 
stress”138. The government uploaded individuals’ cognitive information, from birth to the point 
of bodily death, to machines. Such machines are programmed to think that they are the 
individuals. Thus, Japanese national identity lived on fully intact, as the data (identities) that 
were saved as “Japanese” will always be “Japanese.” Japanese people, or at least Japanese 
identities, work forever for the state. Although the program is no longer supported, the avatars 
live on in the virtual world—including Avatar-Ms, the ten copies of myself. In the virtual world, 
her cybernetic avatars dream of “Japan(s).”  
By presenting not only Japanese identities but identities as a whole as malleable, this film aims to 
contrast and disrupt essentialized discourses surrounding Japanese identity by presenting 
identities in general as malleable and open to rearticulation. It draws from Stuart Hall and Judith 
Butler’s theory of identities as never unified or fixed. I present the identities of both the avatars 
and “Japan(s)” as contingent and mutable in this film, depending on recognition and context. For 
instance, the appearance of the avatar’s body changes, and sometimes multiplies: their 
subjectivity is mutable; they adapt to and reflect whatever context they are in. The mutability of 
the avatar is supported by Stuart Hall’s argument of “identification as a construction, as a 
process never completed—always ‘in process’…identification is … conditional, lodged in 
contingency”139. The shapeshifting “Japan(s)” sometimes takes the form of a woman, sometimes 







138 Cabinet Office, “Moonshot International Symposium Initiative Report,” https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/stmain/mspaper3.pdf. 































How languages affect one’s creative and critical directions is another grounding theme in this 
project. This poem was first written in Japanese and translated to English, and is marked by 
metaphors translated from Japanese wordplay, which is often lost when translated.  
Editing wise, the film is shot in a VR world I created, a conceptual representation of the 
consciousness of the Avatar-Ms. The VR world was sculpted and animated using open-source 3D 
modelling Japanese software including STYLY, VRoidStudio and VWorld. Using shanzhai-ed open-
source textures and materials sourced from Google poly, I modelled the space that resembles 
the inside of the Avatar-Ms which were made from my imagination, drawing on references from 
the SF genre as seen in film, anime, and popular culture. This film serves as the basis for the 
overall narrative and visual vocabulary of the thesis exhibition, introducing the characters 















INHABITING DISTANT GHOSTS 
 
 
There has always been a ghost that haunts those who forget and those who leave rice in 
their bowls. 
Perhaps it is Japan. 
I feel its presence.  
In the morning, the teacups are clean,  
the dust on the shelves are wiped,  
and the garbage is neatly put away. 
At night, I can hear the click-clack of footsteps  
echoing as if something is walking through a hectic station. 
Sometimes, it leaves the floor drenched,  
the shelves overturned. 
It makes the doors rattle  
when there is no wind  









Figure 10. Inhabiting Distant Ghosts, Video installation, projector, canvas, inkjet print, 24” x 16”  
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The substanceless-ness of “Japaneseness” follows me around like a ghost. Here, I visualize the 
“collective, biological fear”140 of earthquakes, tsunamis, and radioactive substances released into 
the sea. Such are the fears that haunt the Japanese people. It is perhaps, the strongest biological 
bond I have with Japan. The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (3.11)—the largest earthquake 
ever recorded in Japan—killed over ten thousand people. From that point on, the collective 
“memory” of 3.11 was added to the “collective, biological fear” of being Japanese; and for me, of 
being.  
After 3.11, the media embraced nationalist narratives. Soft nationalism has been coerced to 
overwrite our “memory,”141  our “collective, biological fear.”142 
At the time of 3.11, I was sent to boarding school in England. Back home, my father—originally 
from the Sendai Prefecture—was, at the time the tsunami hit, in the affected area. On the news, 
hundred of evacuation sites were washed away, along with cars and even houses. Though my 
father is now safe, my family, for a week, could not contact him.  
For almost a decade, I’ve felt a sense of ownership over the “memory” of 3.11. Some would 
consider me a person who “abandoned Japan.” Yet 3.11, through time, has become a link—an 
indirect trauma that connects me, someone who was outside of Japan at the time of the 
incident, and is still situated outside of Japan, with Japan. 
The sociologist Kiyoshi Kanebishi documents ghost stories, the relationship between those 
whose loved ones passed away and the dead. Because the official record of the 3.11 disaster is 
largely “male-dominated,” Kanebishi resorted to studying the letters survivors write to the dead 
and the dreams of women and children. 
“Just like Noh plays, where the world of the dead and the living is woven together,” Kanebishi 
suggests—amidst this strong sociopolitical pressure for Japan to erase the past of trauma in the 
name of reconstruction— that we “not bury the dead, but live in eternity, and move forward in 
time with the dead at our own pace.”  
The diptych consists of photographs taken outside of Japan: one on a ferry and the other on a 
beach—moments when I was reminded of Japan. Here, the visceral nature in photography’s 
subjectivity becomes an invitation for viewers to be sympathetic for my reflection of what has 
happened. I have an indirect experience of 3.11; the viewers are now looking at me reflecting on 
my indirect relationship (connection) with 3.11 (Japan). 
 
 
140 Ayumi Goto, Advisory Comments, OCAD University, December 28, 2020. 
141 Cassandra L Jnes, "Memory and Resistance: Doro's Empire, Mary's Rebellion, and Anyanwu as Lieu De Mémoire in Octavia E. 
Butler's Mind of My Mind and Wild Seed," Women's Studies, vol. 47, no. 7 (2018): 700. 






Figure 11. Installation View of Untitled, looped video, wooden Noh mask purchased on Etsy,  
mask size: 9.05” x 5.51” x 2.75,” 2021 
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This audio-visual installation consists of morphing “Japanese” faces generated using Generative 
Adversarial Network (GAN, a class of machine learning) projected onto a Noh mask of a girl worn 
exclusively by men. The images of faces are sourced from a Japanese platform, “AC Photo,” 
where you can download “Japanese” faces with Caucasian features. These imaginary 
whitewashed “Japanese” faces are projected onto a “ko-omote” Noh mask. There is a sequential 
relationship between my short film, “Dreams Come True Very Much; the Japanese state-owned 
identities, forced to live forever post- “Moonshot,” are colonized identities shaped by the Euro-




Figure 12. Installation View of Untitled, looped video, wooden Noh mask purchased on Etsy,  














Figure 13. Documentation of wooden Noh mask purchased on Etsy,  
mask size: 9.05” x 5.51” x 2.75,” 2021 
 
Noh is a form of classical Japanese-dance drama that evolved from of Chinese Nui Opera in the 
8th century, one of the arts along with “Zen” that Japonisme first discovered centuries ago. Noh 
masks are known to be deceptively expressionless. It is said that when worn by expert actors 
during performances, they convey various emotional expressions despite their fixed physical 
properties. I bring forth stereotypes of East Asians having “mask-like” faces, and specifically 
stereotypes of Japanese in Western societies.  
After 1945, Japan rapidly grew into an industrialized nation and became a leader in technology—
a trademark of Western supremacy—which in turn led to the construction of techno-
Orientalism. In a reversal of the traditional aesthetics of Japan, “the association of technology 
and Japaneseness now serves to reinforce the image of a culture that is cold, impersonal and 
machine-like and authoritarian culture lacking emotional connection to the rest of the world”143. 
After techno-Orientalism, Japan’s new identity in the West was thus labeled as “Japan, Inc.” or 
“sub-human,” a discourse which aimed to portray the Japanese as lacking feeling or emotion.144 
 
143 David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London: 
Routledge, 1995): 168. 
144 Idem, 172. 
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For instance, using the gestures of Japanese businessmen as their model—“robot-like bowing 
and expressionless laughter”—the German band Kraftwerk in the 1970s used android or 
machine-like gestures on the stage.145 At the height of Japan’s economic growth (kokusaika), 
Japan’s “dehumanized” technological powers, such as robots, cyborgs, video games, and anime, 
were seen as postmodern equivalents of Noh.  
Layering of the faces and tatemae (a term meaning “built in front,” “façade”), I create a parallel 
between technology and Noh theatre, both of which are heavily dominated by maleness and 
exclude females. To further contextualize my project, the following is the breakdown of the 
history of Noh through a feminist lens: 
Given Noh’s six hundred year history, women’s involvement in Noh theatre’s hisotory is very 
brief as women have only been allowed to perform on stage professionally since 1948. Eric C. 
Rath, in his essay “Challenging the Old Men: A Brief History of Women in Noh Theatre,” explains 
that the profession of Noh acting used be accessible to a range of social groups including women 
in its earlier times.  
Although little has been written about women who performed before the twentieth century, 
women have greatly contributed to Noh’s development. Tokugawa shogunate (noble classes of 
Japan) policy, established in the early modern period, had tremendous implications for all 
women performers, as the policies relied on exclusionist genealogical discourse centering on 
patrilineal bloodlines, and the equation of blood with professional expertise. As a result, the 
rules excluded women and any performer without Yamato blood from the performing arts. 
According to Rath, the obsession with the creation of such genealogical texts remained 
throughout the seventeenth century; bloodlines were mapped out in lineage charts and family 
histories, and performers competed in invoking the glories of their particular lineage to contend 
for legitimacy in their profession. Since then, Noh became patronized almost exclusively by the 
shogunate patronage as an exclusive samurai pastime that commoners, including all women, 
were forbidden to see or participate in.  
In this regard, female Noh masks represent Japan’s historic patriarchy, and the AI generated 
“Japanese” faces are a digital version of how Japan utilizes patriarchy to serve elitist male 
subjectivity. According to mask expert Nakamura Yasuo, female masks in Noh theatre began to 
appear around the period of Kan’ami and Zeami, the time when Noh developed into a male-
 
145 Toshiya Ueno, “Japanimation and Techno-Orientalism,”Seventh International Symposium on Electronic Art ISEA94 September 
16-20 (Rotterdam: Tripti, 1997): 95. 
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dominated art. It was a period when performers became concerned with representing 
femininity, yet would not allow a place for women to perform.  
By projecting the AI generated faces onto the Noh mask of “ko-omote,” a fake face of “naïve, 
beautiful, young girl” to be worn exclusively by men, I highlight how the performances I have 
noted above serve to perpetuate patriarchy, essentialism, and nationalism. The mask that I am 
using in this project, which has no wearer, aims to provide a counter narrative to both Western 
Orientalist images of Japan and Japan’s self-Orientalism. Through its layers of tatemae, this 
project aims to obscure the essentialized narratives surrounding Japanese identities by 
suggesting that everything is performative. There is never “authenticity” behind masks. Behind a 
mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask is a mask. 
 
Figure 14. Installation View of Untitled, looped video, wooden Noh mask purchased on Etsy,  




















Figure 15. Documentation of Dong, 2021 
 
“蕩 (dong)” is a video in which Cantonese text is accompanied by images taken in Toronto, New 
York, and Tokyo Chinatowns that morph into one another. I worked collaboratively on this 
project with a Hong Kongnese-Canadian translator, writer, and my partner, Sheung-King Tang, 
who worked on the translation of the Chinese character that appears on the screen.  
As a Japanese person who grew up in England and Canada away from family, with no access to 
Japan-towns or Little Tokyo, Chinatowns have acted as surrogates for me from a young age. In 
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this work, I explore how the Western gaze has shaped not only Japan but other diasporic spaces 
around the world, focusing specifically on Chinatowns which are the largest Asian neighborhoods 
in North America. Chinese migrants, to protect themselves from “feared” local residents, have 
developed parallel civic societies; for example, in San Francisco, Chinese merchants, in 1906, 
hired American architects to dream up an oriental city of “veritable fairy palaces…a conscious, 
east-meets west attempt to change the community’s image…and ensure its continuing survival.” 
146 Chinatowns have been shaped according to similar principles ever since.  
 
In this work, a chain of images taken in Chinatown morph into one another. Defying the 
essentialized Orientalist gaze, the possible meanings of the character, “蕩” glide cross the 
screen. In Western philosophy, deconstruction is understood as a reaction to structuralism, but 
shanzhai (deconstruction in Chinese) is a starting point, not a reaction. This is seen through the 
character, “蕩” which can mean anything from “swing,” to “lack of control,” to “slut,” to “travel 
around,” to “make one’s way to home.” The meaning of “蕩” is contingent, its definition is 
continuously deferred. “蕩” can also mean “wonder” and “remove”: there is no “original” 
meaning; the meaning of the word expands—it contextualizes the texts around it and vice versa. 
 
With the absence of “蕩” (the “original” character) in the video, the inaccessibility of the 
“original” allows the translation to be constantly renewed. Tawada notes that “there is never the 
correct translation as translation is never a copy of the original.” Translation is always 
interpretative, and there is an inevitable “loss” in the process. The current politics of translation 
gives prominence to hegemonic languages, but when it is effectively used by the translator, it 
liberates language from fixed meanings.  
Gayatri Spivak calls for the development of “love and affinity” to the text by the translators, to 
decipher the expressions which get lost in between source to the translated text. One must 
“surrender” to the text and facilitate “love” between the source text and the translated text, as a 
resistance to dominant cultural hierarchies, to convey meanings. By juxtaposing the meanings of 
the character with morphing images, I guide viewers to what Tawada calls the “poetic ravine”: a 
space which resists essentialist notions and resounds with the echoes of two languages. The 
understanding of this work lies between the viewer’s subjectivity, the text, and the image itself. 
As Tawada says, “translation is not the image of the original but rather, the meaning of the 
original is given a new body.” This becomes an invitation for viewers to imagine the revived 
meaning(s) of the character. “蕩,” with this “new body,” is now a product of “love and affinity” 
 









Figure 16. An example of how these photographs taken in Chinatowns morph into one another 
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WHEN I USE ENGLISH: THERE IS A HOLE, WAITING TO EAT 
ME, ITS MOUTH WIDE OPEN. LIKE A VAGINA. ECHO 
COMES OUT.  
Figure 17. Installation View of, When I use English: There is a Hole, Waiting to Eat Me, Its Mouth Open. 
Like a Vagina. But Nothing Comes Out. looped video, TV, 2021 
57 
 
Figure 18. Still from When I use English: There is a Hole, Waiting to Eat Me, Its Mouth Open. Like a Vagina. 
But Nothing Comes Out. looped video, TV, 2021 
English language acquisition, especially ESL (the standardization of the English language), as a 
business (often expensive, standardized, test-based, and low-quality), is a neo-colonial gesture. It 
concerns itself less with language learning and more with cultural assimilation and affirming 
Western society’s superiority.  
This work satirizes the homo-hegemony of “Good English” and ESL teaching. Chinese words and 
free stock images overlay a video of ESL teaching, extracting meaning from words that are 
coming out of the ESL teacher's mouth. The images mirror the substanceless-ness of ESL 
teaching. The content of this video prioritizes standard pronunciation to the extent that 
sounding like an English speaker becomes more important than having a fundamental 
understanding of how the world works.  
 
Figure 19. Still from When I use English: There is a Hole, Waiting to Eat Me, Its Mouth Open. Like a Vagina. 
But Nothing Comes Out. 2021 
For instance, in the video, Georgie Harding (the ESL teacher) asks her clients to do a “little 
exercise” when they are getting out of bed, getting dressed, or in the shower. “Say the following 
phrase five times: I saw sixty-six farmers laughing on the phone/farm (I have no idea which one 
she is saying), in front of the mirror, while checking that you are not using a Mandarin, Japanese, 
or Russian mouth position.” The video is originally sourced from a video titled “Great English 
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Pronunciation – Move your mouth for clear English.” In this video, she says that “many of [her] 
non-native speaking clients come to [her] …They are not opening their mouth. They are hardly 
moving their lips.” 
As Jay Lemke argues, “language, dialect, register, and voice are used as identity-markers, coming 
to an environment with its own hegemonic mono language, subjects many non-native English 
speakers to symbolic violence as daily experience.” Roth and Harama point out that ESL students 
find themselves in remedial classes in Western contexts situated in discourses that contribute to 
the construction of ESL students as “lesser beings” and as academically low-performing students. 
In a standardized English context, ESL individuals’ dialects and registers are incommensurable 
with the homo-hegemony of “Good English.” The experiential and intra-linguistic resources that 
students bring with them are no longer valued: ESL students’ pre- and extra-school discourses 
are denigrated as “misconceptions” and “alternative frameworks” that have to be eradicated by 
means of “conceptual change.” 
 
Figure 20. Still from When I use English: There is a Hole, Waiting to Eat Me, Its Mouth Open. Like a Vagina. 
But Nothing Comes Out. 2021 
Using defamiliarizing techniques, my work highlights the “soft, discreet, and glaring terror” 
residing inside the acquisition of a new language, especially for ESL individuals. In this artwork, 
the mouth of the ESL teacher fills up the screen. The ESL teacher's voice is quiet, requiring the 
audience to listen attentively. The subtitles are spelled out in International Phonetic Alphabet 
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(IPA); “a notational standard for the phonetic representation of all languages” (IPA Home, 2017), 
rendering the text almost unintelligible, adding pressure to the audience by situating them in the 
ESL learner’s subjectivity. According to the International Phonetic Association, IPA “creates a 
standard for pronunciation among learners and instructors” and “helps learners understand how 
each sound is correctly pronounced.”  
‘ 
 
Figure 21. Installation view of When I use English: There is a Hole, Waiting to Eat Me, Its Mouth Open. Like 










As night falls, the enthralling feeling comes again. 
Japan and I wrestle and strangle each other once more, but this time the horse with the 
patterns multiplies and runs even faster, circling around us. 
 
Gathering up my courage, I say to Japan, “You don’t exist.”  
The woman smiles and says, “You know that that is not true.”  
It is so easy to put things into words, I think to myself, but wonder if it is really that easy. 
“You don’t like it when I don’t act the way you want me to,” I say to Japan. “I’m done with 
this,” I tell her, and she stops strangling me.  
She stands up and looks back at me with her mouth agape. 
I try not to think about Japan as I stroll along without knowing where I am going.  
I walk. I have no legs. There is no floor. I try not to think about the woman and soon I 
forget the word for her.  
 
Once in a while, I can feel something like me looking at me. 
 
Maari Sugawara, January 27, 2020  
In my work, my alter-ego Avatar-Ms present identities as malleable and open to rearticulation, 
which is my response to rethinking constructed Japanese identities as delinked from the idea of 
“originality,” and devoid of internalized Orientalism. I used “alternative futurity”147 as a concept 
to create artworks that critique and allow a rethinking of the national and cultural identities of 
Japan, and to explore possibilities of “radical reconstitution”148. The avatars and shapeshifting 
“Japan(s)” imply the notion of subjects without any fixed origin or end. Both “Japan(s)” and the 
avatars are vulnerable to reinterpretation and rearticulation, thereby undermining the 
essentialist logic behind categories of differences which has shaped postwar Japanese identity. In 
doing so, I depict identities in an ongoing process of change and oscillation. 
This idea of delinking from the notion of “originality,” a notion that has been deeply complicit 
with postwar Japanese discourses, is also reflected in my use of shanzhai as a methodology. My 
projects use my own works along with stock images and contemporary digital media that do not 
have an “original.” This is my attempt at generating a participatory narrative experience where 
“originality,” to the experiencer, becomes obsolete.  
 
 




In the process of my art-making, I have expanded my technical skills and have acquired some 3D 
animation techniques; however, I was not able to explore VR work as much as I hoped, and there 
are still many paths that I have not yet tested. I wish to further experiment with mediums such 
as VR, AR and sound art in the future.  
 
My art-based research on unravelling the links between Japan’s Eurocentrism, the country’s 
active invitation of the Orientalist gaze, and the artificial amnesia of its colonial aggression 
towards other Asian countries was extremely valuable. It pushed me to consider what I can do as 
a Japanese individual towards Japan’s silence in regard to its own historical crimes and its 
colonial responsibilities. My research has also brought awareness to how it affects my own 
identity as a Japanese person and allowed me to reflect, critically, on my experience living in the 
West. 
 
I was not sure how to make references to Japan’s past, especially its colonial past, which remains 
largely unspoken in Japan. Instead of making direct references to the colonial history and 
wartime atrocities, I decided to depict Japan’s collective amnesia as something that “haunts,” my 
project does not directly describe historical facts. So, I included ghostly elements in my thesis. 
This decision shaped the conceptual thread that holds together my work in this space, works 
that are impossible to hold; they are projections, composed of light and much too large, their 
light fades at the edges, they merge into one another, they meet. I intended to create an 
exhibition that possessed a dematerialized presence. I wanted it to feel ethereal, imagined, yet 
grounded in reality, like memories. As I cannot speak or depict on behalf of those who were 
victimized; this creative decision seemed to me the most empathetic display of the uncanny 
experience of what lies buried underneath constructed Japanese identities. 
 
My narrative-based works took a more autobiographical approach. In my work, I recurrently 
evoke the image of “Japan,” perhaps as a “home”—but positioned as an imaginary place rather 
than a fixed point of origin. The concept of “Japan” in my project is intertwined with my personal 
memories; however, these memories are constantly being taken over by cultural “memories,” 
and such ‘cultural memories’ are overshadowed by whitewashed cultural “memories” 
manipulated by state-promoted cultural policies and discourses. The final product is a dream 
world that is grounded in reality. It is nightmarish and yet still familiar (to me at least). The end 
result is a mixture of the subconscious and conscious—my representation of new forms of 
Japanese identities that aim to encompass complementarity, formless forms of “Japanese-ness.”  
I realize that my research interest may be too large an investigation to undertake within this 
thesis. My work took the first step to an onto-epistemological expansion of Japanese 
consciousness that acknowledges its Euro-American influence or domination; however, there 
were a few scopes that I was unable to investigate as much as I wanted to. For instance, I could 
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not experiment as much as I wanted to with the sound and the text element in my short-film. I 
plan to continue my theoretical research on translation studies and language in order to create a 
space where the text (narrative) and the images on the screen (projected semiology) 
continuously and meaningfully invite and deny meaning. I wish to generate an experience to 
examine how the experiencer’s understanding of language re-adjusts itself to adapt to a 
language system that this preordained artificial circumstance presents. 
Through a discussion with Professor Jay Irizawa about this project, I decided that, in the near 
future, to continue this project, I will consider the following questions:  
 
- Are there technologies that have alternate views we can consider as outside of Western 
thoughts? Can we redevelop such technologies? 
- Is there a Japanese indigenous technology of analog digital origins that Western 
philosophy and its gaze is absent in this constellation? Can we reframe the philosophy 




















APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL IMAGE DOCUMENTATION  
 
 
Figure 22. Partial view of the exhibition 
 




Figure 24. Documentation of Untitled, 2021 
 





Figure 26. Partial view of the exhibition 
 




Figure 28. Documentation of Inhabiting Distant Ghosts, 2021 
 





Figure 30. Partial view of the exhibition 
 





Figure 32. Documentation of Untitled, 2021 
 




Figure 34. Partial view of the exhibition 
 





Figure 36. Partial view of the exhibition 
 





APPENDIX B: ACCOMPANYING DIGITAL MATERIAL  
1.    Dreams Come True Very Much (part 1), 2021 
Animation, 1:49  
Dreams_Come _True _Very _Much_part1.MOV 
2. Dreams Come True Very Much (part 2), 2021 
Animation, 1:19 
Dreams_Come _True _Very _Much_part2.MOV 
3. Documentation of Inhabiting Distant Ghosts, 2021 
Video installation, projector, canvas, inkjet print 24’ x 16’, 1:27 
Inhabiting_Distant_Ghosts.MOV 
4. When I use English: there is a hole, waiting to eat me, its mouth wide open. Like a vagina. 
Echo comes out., 2021 
Audio-visual installation, projector, size variable, 3:58 
When_I_use_English_there_is_a_hole.MOV 
5. 蕩 (dong), 2021 
Video installation, projector, 4:00 
Dong.MOV 
6. Documentation of Untitled, 2021 
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